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AESTRACT 
The  interplay  between  the  tax  laws  of  the  United  States  and  those  of  the 
countries of  Latin America creates inducements for capital flight.  Most Latin 
American countries tax only income originating within their boundaries.  If 
other countries tax income of  foreigners originating within their boundaries as 
heavily, there is no  tax advantage to capital flight.  Latin American countries 
thus depend on other countries for the prevention of  tax—induced capital flight 
and the loss of  public revenues, investment funds, and equity it implies. 
Income from a U.S. trade or business conducted by foreigners, including 
capital gains, is subject to U.S. tax.  Capital gains on real  estate and div- 
idends are generally taxed, but it may be possible to reduce those taxes sub- 
stantially.  The United States does not tax most other capital gains realized 
by foreigners.  Most interest income paid to foreigners is also exempt from 
U.S.  tax.  Thus U.S. tax laws help attract capital from Latin America. 
A solution to this problem does not seem likely.  The United States  seems 
unlikely to reverse its policies.  Little is to  be gained from adoption of a 
residence-based approach by  Latin American countries.  A more radical approach 
that might be more effective would be a switch to consumption-based direct tax- 
ation in which interest income is neither taxed nor allowed as a deduction.  This 
would reduce the attraction of favorable U.S. tax treatment by making equally 
attractive treatment available at home, but raises troublesome  issues of equity, 
the treatment of  foreign investment, and transition. 
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I.  Introduction 
Most countries  of Latin  America attempt to tax only  income  deemed to 
have its source  within their  boundaries; they do not attempt to tax 
income of their residents (or citizens)  deemed to originate in the rest 
of the world.  That is,  they employ a territorial (or source—based) 
system of taxation,  and  do not attempt to implement  worldwide (or 
residence—based) taxation.1  To the extent that residents of nations 
relying  on  source—based taxation invest their capital  in other countries, 
they  can avoid taxation in their  home  country.  Even  when  Latin  American 
nations attempt to implement  worldwide taxation, success in this endeavor 
is likely to be difficult for administrative reasons.  Taxpayers in most 
Latin  American countries that employ the residence  principle who are 
willing to coimnit fraud  are generally able to evade tax on foreign—source 
income  with relative impunity. 
The direct result  of the failure or inability of such countries to 
tax foreign—source income is loss of tax revenues  potentially available 
on such income.  A  more serious threat  is the loss of capital that could 
productively be invested at home and the further diminution of the tax 
base and the loss of equity it implies.  Of  course, to the extent that 
other countries tax all income deemed  to originate within  their 
boundaries at rates at or above those levied in Latin American countries, 
there is no tax advantage to capital flight,  regardless of the tax 
1 treatment (residence  or source)  in the hone country.2  In a sense then, 
the countries of Latin America that do not tax (or cannot effectively 
tax) income  earned abroad are dependent  to some degree on other countries 
for the prevention of tax—induced  capital flight  and the loss of public 
revenues, investment funds,  and equity it implies.3 
Income from a U.S. trade or business conducted  by foreigners is 
subject to tax in the U.S. on the same  basis as a business conducted  by 
residents of the U.S.  But this is probably  much less relevant for the 
present discussion of capital flight  induced by favorable  U.S. taxation 
than the tax treatment of income  earned on passive investments. 
The United States does not tax most capital gains realized by 
foreigners,  except those on real estate  and those effectively connected 
with a trade or business.  Most interest  income paid to unrelated 
foreigners  is exempt from  U.S.  tax,  whether paid by financial 
institutions or by others.  Dividends  on  corporate  shares and  capital 
gains on  real estate  are generally subject to tax, but in the case of 
dividends it nay be possible to reduce  taxes  substantially  through the 
use  of nominee accounts in treaty partners of the U.S.  Thus the United 
States acts  as an enormous magnet poised to attract capital  from Latin 
America,  especially debt funds. 
This paper examines  the inducements to capital flight produced  by 
the interplay between the tax laws of the United States and those of the 
countries of Latin America.  Complicating  this interaction is the 
possibility of channeling investments through tax haven countries with 
which the United States has tax treaties.  Fortunately for the countries 
of Latin America,  there are relatively few such countries.  While the 
United States has moved in recent years  to reduce the opportunities to 
2 use "treaty shopping" to reduce taxes, it has followed domestic tax 
policies that aggravate the problem of capital flight from Latin  America. 
Section II describes the general principles  that govern the taxation 
of income from capital moving across  national boundaries, including 
relevant  provisions of major model treaties for the prevention of double 
taxation.  This description is provided to set the stage for the 
discussion of the rest of the paper.  It includes a limited discussion of 
the background  and  apparent rationale for the existing tax treatment of 
such  income in order to serve as background  for the discussion in the 
final section of potential remedies  to the problem of capital flight from 
Latin America induced by generous treatment  of certain forms of income 
earned in the United States by foreigners. 
Section III  focuses briefly on the tax systems of Latin American 
countries.  The purpose is to indicate how problems of capital  flight and 
tax avoidance and evasion created by the U.S. tax law are aggravated by 
the tax treatment of capital  income typically  found in these countries. 
Besides noting that most  countries of Latin America do not attempt to tax 
foreign—source income, it indicates  why it is difficult for the few that 
attempt  to impose tax on a worldwide basis to do  so effectively. 
This description of tax systems employed in Latin  ?imerica is quite 
brief for several reasons.  Most obviously,  it is difficult to go beyond 
the basic characterization  of a system  as being based on either source  or 
residence,  without becoming embroiled in minute details.  More important, 
little  would be gained from a detailed examination  of the tax laws of 
Latin  American countries.  A  basic premise of this paper is that every 
tax system in Latin America is in effect likely  to resemble a 
source—based system,  especially in its taxation of passive income, even 
3 if the tax law states that worldwide income is to be taxed. 
Section  IV describes  how the United States  taxes five kinds of 
income received  by foreigners:  income  from the conduct of a trade or 
business, interest on bank deposits, interest  earned on portfolio 
investments  in debt,  income (including  capital gains) from other 
portfolio investment,  and capital gains from investment in real estate. 
Attention focuses on the last four items of non—business income, as they 
appear to be the forms in which income is most likely to be earned by 
Latin  Americans wishing to invest  in the United States  without leaving 
their home countries. 
Section V  discusses potential solutions to the problem of capital 
flight induced by attractive U.S.  tax treatment  of income  earned by 
foreigners.  Approaches considered include  both changes in the tax system 
of the United States and  changes in the tax systems of Latin American 
countries  Many of the current provisions  of U.S law can be traced to 
the perceived need to respond to eonetitive  pressures from foreign 
countries  arid to abuses of international tax treaties  with the United 
States; as a result,  resolution of the problem based on changes  in U.S. 
law might require cooperation  by other developed countries, including 
treaty partn5rs of the United  States, and various tax haven countries. 
That this is true indicates clearly that there is not nuich  room for 
optimism  thtt a solution to the problem addressed here based on U.S. 
action will quickly be  found and adopted. 
From what has been said above,  it is clear that most Latin  American 
countri'.  ' wnid gain little benefit from adoption of  a residence—based 
approach.  A more effective approach, but one that is ITruch more  radical, 
tch  to a  consumption—based  system  of direct taxation in 
4 which interest income is neither taxed nor allowed as a deduction.  This 
would reduce the attraction of favorable  U.S. tax treatment by  making 
equally attractive treatment  available at home.  It does, however, raise 
troublesome  issues of equity, the treatment of foreign investment, and 
transition. 
It may be appropriate to state clearly,  before proceeding, that the 
discussion that follows is not based on a naive view that taxes are the 
only determinant of international capital  flows, or even  the most 
important determinant.  Clearly much more  important than  taxes  as reasons 
for capital  flight from developing countries are such concerns as 
political instability and  fears of economic crises and  currency 
fluctuations.  Similarly, any tax advantages of investment in the United 
States are likely to be dwarfed, inter alia,  by the attraction of 
political stability.  Yet, all things  ,  the  tax treatment of various 
items of U.S. source income in the United States and elsewhere almost 
certainly does exert an influence on investment  decisions at the margin. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe some of the most important of 
the features of U.S. tax law that may have this effect, especially those 
that result from liberal U.S. tax treatment  of income  earned in the 
United States by foreigners. 
No attempt is made to quantify either  the attraction offered by 
these tax benefits, relative to other forms  of attraction (e.g., 
differences in political stability) or the amount of capital that may  be 
drawn into the United States by them.  Attempting to answer either of 
these questions  would be a hopeless task;  the difficulty in the second 
case of holding all other influences constant is compounded by the lack 
of reliable data. 
S Finally, attention focuses on U.S. tax policy as an attraction to 
capital; no effort is made to provide either a detailed description  of 
the tax laws of Latin  merican countries or a comparison of U.S. law with 
tax provisions found in the laws of other countries, especially those of 
.7apan arid the developed countries of Europe.  Of course, to the extent 
that foreign investors  are treated generously in other countries, 
comparably generous U.S. treatment  may, at least in part, merely divert 
investment from them,  rather  than inducing  additional capital flows from 
Latin  America.  If generous taxation of the income of foreigners 
continues elsewhere, the tax—induced  attraction of funds from Latin 
American countries way not be reduced  much by a unilateral tightening of 
U.S. taxation of such income. 
II.  Principles  of International  Taxation 
There are two basic approaches  to the taxation of income flowing 
between countries,  Under the source  principle all income originating in 
a given lurisdiction is taxed,  but that originating elsewhere is not. 
This is sometimes  also called a  territorial  approach.  The residence or 
worldwide approach, by comparison,  taxes all the income  of residents of 
the taxing jurisdiction,  wherever earned.3  Many countries, including the 
United States,  employ both approaches.  That is, they tax both income 
originating  within their borders and all the income of  residents, 
wherever  earned. 
Advocates of the residence  principle cite the following primary 
advantages.  First, residence—based taxation does  not discriminate 
between  income flows,  depending on their country of source;  that is, 
income is taxed  the same, whether  earned in  the United States or in a 
6 foreign country  (and  regardless  which foreign country).  This feature of 
residence—based  taxation is sometimes called "capital—export  neutrality." 
If employed effectively  by all nations, residence—based  taxation  would 
not interfere  with the allocation  of economic resources  among nations; in 
principle, it would lead to the allocation  of the world's capital to the 
most productive uses.  By comparison,  source—based taxation (if not 
matched by benefits of public spending)  discourages investment  in 
high—tax jurisdictions  and encourages investment  in law—tax 
jurisdictions.4 
Second, implementation  of the ability—to—pay  principle of taxation 
requires that residents  of a country  pay tax on their entire income under 
the personalized system  prevailing  there, rather than having it taxed at 
the rates applied in the countries  where it is earned.  This objective is 
also achieved by residence—based  taxation.  Finally, capital—exporting 
countries support residence—based  taxation because they  want the revenue 
at stake.5 
Advocates of  source—based taxation argue,  in part, that the source 
country is entitled to capture  for  its public coffers part of the income 
originating within  its borders.6  Moreover,  they argue,  residence—based 
taxation is inevitably  difficult to administer,  especially  in a 
developing country.7  These  difficulties are examined further in the next 
section.  To the extent that worldwide taxation cannot be administered 
effectively, capital flight (from  the countries with inadequate 
administration) is encouraged  and the theoretical  advantages  of 
capital—export  neutrality are not actually achieved.8 
Double taxation would result  from the application  of both source and 
residence—based  taxation to a particular international flow of income. 
7 Countries employing the residence  principle corsnonly defer to the fiscal 
claims of source countries.  In the United States this is achieved 
unilaterally by allowing credit against domestic tax liability for income 
taxes paid to foreign governments,  up to the average rate of taxation 
paid in the United States.9  As long as the foreign tax rate does not 
exceed the domestic tax rate,  capital—export  neutrality is achieved.  As 
an alternative, a taxpayer can, at its option,  take a deduction for 
foreign taxes, rather  than a  credit)0  u.s. tax treaties also regulate 
the tax treatment of  income  flowing between treaty parthers.  The 
problem,  then is to establish norms  for taxation by countries of 
source 
In deciding both whether to utilize source  or residence—based 
taxation and whether the tax system of the source  or residence  nation 
should be given precedence in international  tax conventions,  nations 
face conflicting  objectives.  For example, a capital—importing  nation 
might like to enact heavy source—based  taxes,  in order to capture tax 
revenue for its treasury.  On  the other hand,  it may fear the adverse 
effects  source—based taxation that is not offset by  foreign tax credits 
in capital—exporting countries would have on  foreign investment in the 
country.  Indeed,  a decision may be made by the source  country to forgo 
tax revenues in order  to attract capital.  This is especially likely 
where potential foreign investors reside in countries that do not or 
cannot tax foreign—source income, 
For revenue reasons,  a capital—exporting  country can be expected to 
prefer  residence—based taxation.  This pattern is exemplified in the tax 
laws of the  United States and,  sometimes to a lesser  degree,  in those of 
many other developed countries.  Long  (but no longer)  the premier example 
8 of a capital—exporting  nation, the United States employs residence—based 
taxation.  Whereas it unilaterally extends priority in taxation to the 
source country through its foreign tax credit, it attempts to protect its 
position as a capital exporter by pressing for provisions in its foreign 
tax treaties that reduce source—country  taxation of interest,  dividends, 
and various other forms of payments to its residents.  Capital—importing 
countries can be expected to favor  an international system in which 
source—based taxes on these types of income  are higher than proposed by 
capital—exporting countries and  in which the latter countries  provide 
foreign tax credits for source—based  taxes.  Such a situation  allows them 
to raise revenue from foreign  multinational corporations with little  fear 
of adverse economic consequences,  as long as the tax rates  applied to 
these forms of income by the source  country do not exceed those in home 
countries allowing foreign tax credits. 
These contrary pressures of conflicting  objectives can be seen by 
comparing the United Nations (U.N.) Model Double Taxation Convention 
between Developed and Developing Countries  with the Draft Double  Taxation 
Convention on Income and on Capital published by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation  and Developoent (OE).  The latter  draft convention 
is relevant primarily for fiscal relations  between developed countries. 
Since capital flows aiing such countries  can be expected to be roughly in 
balance (at least multilaterally over the long run), the distinction 
between capital—importing  and capital—exporting  countries  may  be have 
little significance.  Thus the OE  draft treaty, reflecting  the 
preference of these countries for the residence  principle, calls for 
limiting  withholding taxes on interest to 10 percent of the gross amount 
of interest. 
9 By comparison, the U.N. model convention  involves both developing 
countries that are generally capital importers and developed ones that 
export capital.  It leaves the limitation  on the tax rate on interest 
unstated, to be the subject of bilateral  negotiations between the 
contracting parties.  This difference reflects  the conflict between "the 
strong view on the part of members from developing countries that those 
countries should have the exclusive,  or at least the primary right to tax 
interestu and the view of the representatives  of developed countries that 
the home country of investors should  have the primary or even exclusive 
right to tax such income.12  Analogous ambiguity and latitude for 
negotiations characterizes the U.N.  guidelines on withholding rates  on 
dividends, in contrast to the definite limits stated in the OECD model 
convention, 
Foreign tax treaties of the United  States conmnly give the country 
of residence  an increased secondary claim in the taxation of certain 
types of income (e.g.,  interest, dividends,  and capital gains) by 
providing reduced taxation by the source country.  Besides capturing tax 
revenues on income from U.S. capital invested  abroad for the U.S. 
Treasury and encouraging capital  flows  between treaty parthers and the 
United States,  such treaties are subject  to abuse;  the most  connon forms 
of  abuse  are described in section IV.  Moreover,  for certain  types of 
income earned in the U.S.  by foreigners  the United States does  not 
attempt to impose source—based taxation as a matter of domestic tax 
policy. 
III.  Latin  American Practice 
Most countries of Latin  America attempt to tax most income from 
10 business and capital earned within their borders by both residents  and 
non—residents.13  The top tax rates applied to individual income range 
from 30 percent in Bolivia, Colombia,  and Paraguay, to 55 percent or 
above in Chile, the Dominican Republic,  El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
and Panama.  Corporate rates are generally  similar, but commonly somewhat 
lower.  (See  Table 1.)  Of course, the actual  burden on domestic source 
income  depends on the details of the tax law of various countries.  But 
one thing is certain.  Unless income  earned  abroad by  residents is also 
taxed, either by  the home country or by the country in which capital is 
invested, there are tax—induced incentives  for capital flight. 
The countries of Latin  America have traditionally been  strong 
proponents of the source principle of taxation.'4  This  is reflected in 
the pattern of jurisdictional  standards reported  in Table 1.  Of the 18 
countries covered, only five attempt to tax the worldwide income  of 
corporations and only seven  do so for individuals.  Although several of 
the more advanced countries of Latin  America do attempt to tax on a 
worldwide basis (e.g.,  Brazil, but only for individuals, Chile, Colombia, 
and Mexico), several others do not (e.g. Argentina and Venezuela), and 
several of the countries attempting  worldwide taxation are not highly 
advanced (e.g.,  El Salvador, but only for individuals, Honduras, and 
Peru).  With  few exceptions (Honduras  and Brazil, which allows credit 
only as permitted by treaty) the countries  that follow the worldwide 
approach allow foreign tax credit  for  taxes  paid to source countries. 
With  the exception of Argentina (eight treaties)  and Brazil  (fifteen), 
Latin American countries are parthers to few tax treaties  other  than the 
Andean Pact between Bolivia, Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru  and  Venezuela.  No 
Latin  American country has a foreign tax treaty with the United States. 
11 Even the figures in Table 1 almost  certainly greatly overstate 
effective reliance on residence—based  taxation.  Major domestic Latin 
Pmerican corporations operating abroad,  whether through subsidiaries or 
branches, can be expected to report  income to their home countries, 
though  perhaps not with total accuracy)5 The accuracy of reporting is 
likely  to depend, inter alia,  on the existence and effectiveness of 
exchange controls,  on the availability  of (and limitations  on)  the 
foreign tax credit in the  home country, on the extent of  exchange of 
information between  fiscal authorities of the source country and the home 
country,  and  on the feasibility of structuring intercorporate relations 
in such a way as to circumvent such  exchanges  of information and other 
administrative controls of the home  country.  But  this does  not seem  to 
be of primary importance for the purpose at hand, both because  (as is 
documented further below)  income from the conduct of a trade or business 
in the U.S. is subject to tax, even if it is earned by a  foreign person, 
and because this type of foreign investment (investment  in a trade or 
business) by zatin ?dnericans does not seem to be the essential problem of 
tax—induced  capital flight.'6 
The real potential for tax—induced  capital flight  would appear to 
involve investment in interest—bearing  securities  and bank accounts, 
corporate shares,  and  real estate  in the United States.  The U.S. does 
not tax ist interest paid to unrelated foreigners,  and capital gains  on 
assets other than real estate  realized by foreigners are exempt from u.s. 
tax.  It may also be possible to reduce substantially U.S. taxes on 
corporate  dividends  (and  with greater risk and less flexibility those  on 
capital gains on real estate).  Provisions of U.S.  law dealing with these 
types  of income are discussed in the next section.  The  question to be 
12 addressed briefly in the remainder  of this section is whether a Latin 
American country that attempts  to impose taxation on a worldwide  basis 
can effectively do  so on  these  types of  income  from passive investment. 
It appears that a negative answer is virtually inevitable. 
Exceptions  would be likely to occur only in the simplest cases.  For 
example, someone might repatriate  funds through legal channels to a 
country with strong  exchange controls and not be able to prove that the 
funds  do not constitute  income.  In fact,  one would not ordinarily expect 
that passive income  earned abroad on which neither foreign nor domestic 
tax had been paid would be repatriated  through legal channels.  Moreover, 
since no country in Latin America, including  those employing the 
worldwide approach, has a double taxation treaty  with the United States, 
the exchange of tax information  with the United States is nonexistent. 
Even if there  were such a treaty,  it would be simple  and relatively  safe 
to give the bank or other payor of interest  a false address of 
convenience, for example, in another Latin  American country that employs 
the territorial system  or in a tax haven country that has a treaty  with 
the U.S.  In the case of bank  interest,  even this is not necessary. 
Since financial institutions are not required  to report  payments of 
interest to foreign investors to the U.S. Internal  Revenue Service, an 
exchange of information  agreement would serve little  purpose; under U.S. 
law there  would be no information to exchange. 
Given the difficulties the United States  has in preventing its own 
citizens from evading taxes on domestic—source  interest and dividend 
income (through  means to be described in section  V), there is little 
reason to believe that any Latin American country can effectively apply a 
worldwide system  of taxation to non—business income  earned in the United 
13 States by its residents,  either  with or without cooperation  from the 
United States,  Of course, under current  U.S. law and in  the absence of 
treaties there is little such cooperation. 
IV.  U.S. Law:  Principles  and Facts 
The United States  has traditionally  been a strong advocate of the 
principle of residence—based  taxation.  Even so,  it is also coomonly said 
to apply source—based taxation to income originating within the country, 
as well as to the foreign income of U.S.  persons.  In fact, aside  from 
income earned in a trade or business,  interest paid to affiliates, and 
capital gains on real estate, much  income from capital originating in the 
United States is legally exempt from tax if earned by foreigners)'7  More 
cart be taxed at low rates  if channelled through treaty  partners of the 
United States. 
A.  Income from a Trade or Business 
Income received by foreigners  from the conduct of a trade or 
business in the United States  has long been subject to U.S.  taxation. 
The  Foreign Investors Tax Act (FITh)  of 1966 made two important changes 
that restrict the scope of taxation in this area in ways that encourage 
capital  flight from other countries to the United States to avoid taxes. 
First, it provided that investment income  (conmionly  termed  "fixed  or 
determinable annual or periodical," or FDAP income)  received by 
foreigners also engaged in business  in the United States would be 
included in the taxable income from the conduct of a trade or business 
only if "effectively connected"  with such a trade or business.18  (The 
most important items of  FDAP are  interest,  dividends, rents and 
14 royalties.  Gains on the sale of capital assets  may also be characterized 
as effectively connected.)  By comparison,  the "force  of attraction" 
doctrine of prior law had provided that investment  income  earned by a 
foreign corporation  or individual engaged in a trade or business would 
automatically be included  in the taxable income of that trade  or 
business. 
This distinction is important,  because investment income (FDA.P)  was 
subject to tax at a fixed rate,  cometonly 30 percent unless reduced by 
treaty,  on the gross amount.  By comparison,  income deemed to be derived 
from pursuit of a trade or business (including  that drawn by the force of 
attraction)  was subject to progressive rates reaching  as high as 70 
percent, though only on net income  after deductions.'9 
The second  important change made  by the FITP was to clarify that 
holding  securities for investment purposes did not constitute a trade or 
business,  even if an agent resident in the United States was  granted 
authority to use discretion in managing a portfolio.  Together these two 
provisions reduced substantially  the likelihood that investment income 
would be subject to tax as income from a trade  or business.20  Initially 
they implied primarily that such investment  income  would be subject to 
the 30 percent withholding rate (or lower rate,  as provided by treaty); 
with the increased  use of treaty shopping  and the eventual repeal of 30 
percent withholding on portfolio interest these  provisions have assumed 
even greater importance; see parts C  and D of this section. 
The FITh was passed in response to concern about the balance of 
payments problems the United States  was experiencing in the early l960s. 
That the purpose was to attract foreign capital into  the United States 
was made quite explicit in the report  of a task force appointed by 
15 President Kennedy in 1963 that transmitted  its report  to President 
Johnson in April 1964.  The task force report  stated, "revision  of U.S. 
taxation of foreign investors is one of the most  ixmnediate and productive 
ways to increase  the flow of foreign capital  to this country."  With this 
purpose in mind,  it recolx!nended,  "that a nonresident  alien individual 
engaged in trade or business within the United States  be taxed at regular 
rates  only on income  connected  with such trade or business."2' 
B.  Bank Interest 
Interest on bank accounts has long been  exempt from U.S.  taxation 
when  paid to foreigners.  This exemption  (which was  implemented  by the 
construction of attributing such  income to foreign sources prior to 
rationalization  via an explicit exemption in the 1986 Tax Reform  Act) is 
justified as responding  to competitive  pressures from abroad; it is 
argued that without such an exemption  U.S. banks would be unable to 
compete for funds in international  capital markets.22 
U.S. financial institutions  paying interest to a foreign recipient 
are under no obligation  to report  the payments to the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service.  As indicated  more fully in part F of this Section, some 
U.S. residents  probably use this exemption,  as well as that for interest 
on debt securities and the reduced rates  provided by treaties, to avoid 
U.S. taxes.  This is relevant  because it indicates just  how  difficult it 
would be for Latin American countries  employing the worldwide approach to 
tax U.S. source inc  of these types. 
C.  Portfolio Interest 
until 1984 interest on portfolio investment  in debt securities 
16 issued in the U.S. was subject to 30 percent withholding (or lower rates, 
as provided by treaty).  It was, however, a relatively  conuiion (though far 
from simple) matter for a U.S. corporation  to avoid  paying this tax by 
using a  finance  subsidiary incorporated  in the Netherlands Antilles, with 
which the U.S.  had a quite favorable  treaty. 
The following is a  simple example of this abuse  of the treaty 
process.  The  finance  subsidiary of  a U.S.  corporation  chartered in the 
Netherlands Antilles (N.A.)  would float a public issue in the Eurodollar 
bond market and loan  the proceeds to its U.S.  parent.  The parent would 
obtain a deduction for interest paid to the finance subsidiary, but the 
interest payments made  by the U.S.  parent  to its finance  subsidiary would 
be exempt  from U.S.  withholding taxation under the terms of the treaty 
between the Netherlands and the United States,  as  extended  to the 
Netherlands Antilles.  The finance subsidiary  would be subject to tax on 
interest income in the Netherlands  Antilles only to the extent of the 
spread between the interest paid and  interest received,  consnonly 
approximately one percentage  point.  Interest  payments made by the 
finance subsidiary to bond holders would be exempt from taxation in both 
the United States and the Netherlands  Antilles.  Moreover, subject to 
certain limitations,  the income tax paid to the Netherlands  Antilles 
could be used to offset dollar for dollar the U.S. parent's U.S. income 
tax liability  via the foreign tax credit.23 
The Tax Reform of 1984 repealed the 30 percent tax on interest paid 
to foreigners for portfolio  obligations issued  after July 18, 1984, the 
date of enactment.  Several justifications  can be given for the repeal of 
30 percent withholding on portfolio interest.  First, repeal increased 
tax equity and the  efficiency of international  transactions  by extending 
17 to all borrowers and lenders the  tax treatment that had previously been 
available  only to those able (perhaps  because of size)  to take advantage 
of the type of "treaty shopping'  manipulation described above.24  It was 
deemed inadvisable  simply to attempt to close  the treaty shopping 
loophole,  since  to do  so would place U.S.  borrowers  at a disadvantage in 
Eurodollar  markets,  since  lenders  cormonly insisted upon a return high 
enough to compensate  for the U.S. withholding tax.25  Of course, repeal 
of 30 percent withholding increased  the attraction  of U.S. investments 
for those from all countries  with mobile capital.26  As a result it 
facilitated  financing the large deficits in the U.S. balance of payments. 
Second, it would enable the U.S. government  to reduce  interest outlays 
necessary to finance the large and rapidly growing debt of the federal 
government. 
Following  years of debate and negotiations  the U.S.  government 
announced on June 30, 1987 the termination  of its tax treaty  with the 
Netherlands  antilles, effective January  1, 1988.  Because of the outcry 
from world financial  markets, the termination  was eventually rescinded 
for interest  payments, leaving them eligible for benefits of the 
treaty.27  The repeal  of 30 percent withholding  makes this largely 
academic, except for interest on existing debt.  While repeal of the 
Netherlands  antilles treaty  will eliminate the most egregious opportunity 
for treaty  shopping, it will not totally eliminate the problem posed by 
third—country use of treaties especially for non—interest payments.  (For 
nre  on this,  see the next part of this section and, in a different 
context, section V below.) 
D.  Other Portfolio Income 
18 Capital gains on assets  other than real  estate (to be considered 
irtunediately  below) realized by foreign persons are generally exempt from 
U.S. tax.  Such gains are subject to tax only  if they are "effectively 
connected'  with a U.S. trade  or business (see part A of  this section), 
or,  in the case of an individual,  if the owner was present in the U.S. 
for more than 182 days during the year of disposition. 
Dividends, royalties,  and other forms of portfolio income  paid to 
foreigners  and not yet discussed are subject to 30 percent withholding, 
except as reduced by treaties.28  As with interest income  under pre—1984 
law, there are opportunities for residents  of nations having no treaty 
with the United States (as well as U.S. citizens) to channel funds 
through treaty countries in order to benefit from the reduced  withholding 
rates  provided by treaty. 
Abuse of the treaty mechanism is relatively  straightforward.  Under 
U.S. law the recipient of U.S.—source dividends  need only provide an 
address in a treaty country to the payor  of dividends in order to benefit 
from the reduced rate of withholding  provided by treaty.  Unless the 
withholding agent has knowledge that the recipient of dividends is not 
actually a resident of the treaty  country, it is allowed under U.S. law 
to apply the reduced withholding rates specified  in the treaty  with the 
relevant country.  Though slightly different,  the withholding 
requirements for non—dividend income are equally lax; it is a simple 
matter to obtain reduced withholding rates  by certifying residence in a 
treaty country.  Since U.S. regulations  do not require that payors of 
portfolio income  determine the identity  and residence  of the beneficial 
owners  of nominee accounts, such accounts held in treaty countries can be 
used to evade U.S. withholding tax on such income.29 
19 E.  Capital Gains on  Real Property 
Before  passage of the Foreign Investment  in Real Property Tax Act of 
1980 (FIRPTP),  a foreign investor could easily invest in real property in 
the United States  and incur  no U.S. tax liability on gains realized on 
disposition  of the property.  A  simple  way to achieve this result  would 
be to hold the  real  property through a U.S. or foreign corporation and 
then sell the corporation's  stock.3° 
FIRPTP  changes this situation dramatically.  Under FIRPTP tax is 
imposed on gains realized after June 18,  1980  by a foreign person upon 
the disposition of a 'United States real  property interest'  (USRPI). 
This effect is achieved through the formal  mechanism of deeming all gains 
and losses from dispositions of USRPIs as effectively  connected with a 
U.S. trade or business.31  (FIBPTh  does not, however, change the basic 
rule that mere ownership of U.S. real  property does not cause a foreign 
person to be deemed to be engaged in U.S. trade or business, in the 
absence of active  management or the exercise of an option to be treated 
in this  way.)  In so doing it over—rides  foreign tax treaties that 
allowed the taxpayer the option of choosing annually whether gains and 
losses would be deemed to be from a trade or business.32 
In addition to direct fee—simple  ownership of property, such 
arrangements as leaseholds and options to acquire property interests are 
included in the scope of the definition  of a USRPI.  Noreover, an 
interest in a  U.S. corporation (other  than simply  as a creditor), half of 
whose assets are U.S. property (a United States real property holding 
corporation  or USRPHC) is also a USRPI.33  For purpose of FIRPTh real 
property is defined broadly, and includes interests in cooperative 
apartments, residential  dwellings, plants and factories, rental  property 
20 and hotels,  and interests  in mineral, timber,  and oil and gas properties. 
The passage of FIRPTP seems to have been motivated both by concern 
that foreign investors  were bidding up the price of American farm  land 
and  by the view that it was unfair that foreigners  could profit from 
investment in U.S. real estate  without paying any U.S.  tax, while 
Americans could not.34 
As originally  passed, FIRPT imposed extensive  reporting 
requirements on U.S.  nonpublic corporations, partherships, trusts,  and 
estates  which  had a  foreign  investor whose  pro—rata share of the entity's 
USRPI exceeded $50,000 and on  any foreign person not  engaged in a trade 
or business  in the United States owning  a USRPI exceeding  that figure  in 
value  and not otherwise required  to file an information return.35 
Alternatively,  a  security deposit for  the payment of federal income taxes 
could be furnished  in lieu of filing certain  of the information reports 
described above. 
These  requirements for  information  reporting were extremely complex 
and  ambiguous,  as well as intrusive.  They  were strongly resisted.  It 
was generally felt that many foreign persons and  U.S.  entities through 
which  foreign persons hold tJSRPIs  would be unwilling or unable to comply 
with  the reporting  and/or security requirements  of the law.  As a result 
the tax reform act passed in 1984  substituted  a system of withholding for 
the system  based on reporting  and security deposits.36  In general the 
transferee of a  USRPI is required to withhold 10  percent of the amount 
realized from the disposition  of a USRPI.  Under certain circumstawes 
the withholding requirements are placed on  corporations, partherships, 
and  trusts.  In addition a  foreign  corporation  that distributes  a tJSRPI 
to its shareholders (whether  foreign or domestic) in a  transaction in 
21 which gain is taxable  under FIRPTP  must withhold 34 percent of such gain. 
These obligations  can be avoided if the transferor  of the USRPI certifies 
that the transferor  is not a foreign  person and provides the U.S. 
taxpayer identification  number of the transferor.37 
There has been some concern that FIRPT  might be having less impact 
than originally envisaged, in part because it has been interpreted  quite 
narrowly and  the repeal  of 30 percent withholding  has been given an 
overly broad interpretation.  Regulations  indicate that the 1984 tax act 
repealed withholding  on interest  payments on certain private placements, 
as well as for portfolio investments  in publicly traded securities.  It 
has been unclear whether under FIRPTA it would be possible to structure 
an interest in real estate as a creditor  having strong elements of equity 
participation in such a way that it would not constitute  a USRPI. If so, 
investments  with the economic features  of an equity investment  but the 
legal features of debt  could be used to circumvent  the purpose of FIRPTA. 
If a  foreign creditor  were given fixed interest  bonds with additional 
payments contingent  on appreciation of property,  a USRPI  would almost 
certainly be  found  to exist.  Actual transactions would generally be much 
more complicated than this, so  that the economic nature  of the matter 
would be less transparent.  The tax treatment of debt with contingent 
interest/equity  kickers based on net operating  profits, appreciation of 
property, or gain on the sale of property is somewhat less certain.  The 
U.S. Treasury Department has, however,  warned taxpayers that it will 
interpret debt with  "equity kickers"  as USRPI5  subject to FIBPT 
other potential  gap in FIBPTA  results  from the fact that it may be 
possible to structure ownership  arrangements  in such a way  as to avoid a 
taxable disposition under U.S.  tax law.  For example, a USRPI might be 
22 held by a foreign corporation;  the ownership  of the foreign entity  could 
change  without triggering  U.S. taxation  under FIRPTP.  Even though  a 
foreign corporation  can be characterized  as an RPHC, disposition of its 
stock by a foreign person is not subject to U.S. tax under FIRPTP.  Of 
course,  this is likely to be a quite clumsy  investment vehicle, 
particularly since  the buyer assumes the corporation's "tax history" in 
such a case.  It can  be assumed, moreover, that the purchaser of stock in 
such a corporation  would reduce the price paid for  such stock to reflect 
the tax that must be paid upon liquidation;  since  the buyer  (through the 
corporation)  retains the seller's basis in the real property,  tax can be 
deferred indefinitely,  but it cannot  be avoided completely.  On balance, 
the most appropriate conclusion is probably that the taxation of capital 
gains on U.S. real estate realized  by foreigners  has been tightened 
substantially, though some gains may escape tax or may be deferred for 
long periods. 
F. Suxmtary Assessment 
Recent years have seen a pattern in the evolution  of the U.S. 
taxation of income from capital earned  by foreigners.  First,  income 
from the conduct of a trade or business in the United States remains 
fully taxable.  There seems to be no  inclination to lighten the tax 
burden of foreigners doing business in the United States;  indeed, it was 
increased in relative terms by  the Tax  Reform Act of  1986,  especially by 
the provisions  pertaining to the branch profit tax.  Moreover, gains 
from the sale of U.S.  real estate are now subject to income tax,  and 
withholding is applied to the gross proceeds from such  sales in many 
cases.  This change was made explicitly to forestall foreign investment 
23 in U.S. real estate and to equalize tax treatment of American and 
foreign investors in real  estate. 
By comparison,  portfolio interest has joined interest  paid by 
financial institutions in being exempt from withholding tax.  To a large 
extnt  this simply ratified the status  quo, since  many large 
corporations  had come to use financing  subsidiaries chartered in the 
Netherlands  Antilles to circumvent  the previously existing withholding 
requirements.  It is noteworthy,  however, that this problem was attacked 
by exempting portfolio interest, rather  than by simply  abrogating the 
Netherlands  Antilles treaty, because of the express desire to avoid 
putting American borrowers at a disadvantage relative to their foreign 
competitors,  who are said to have ready  access to financial  markets 
abroad without  the requirement to pay withholding taxes. 
Other forms  of portfolio income  received by foreigners  remain 
subject to withholding tax, but these taxes can be reduced substantially 
by channeling investments through countries with which the United States 
has tax treaties.  Residents of non—treaty countries, as well as U.S. 
residents,  can use these  techniques to  avoid U.S.  withholding taxes  on 
payments to residents of non—treaty nations.  It is thus  not surprising 
that in 1978 almost ninety percent of investment income sent  from the 
United States to foreign countries flowed to countries having  tax 
treaties with the United States.  Even more telling is the fact that 
approximately one—half of dividends and one—third  of non—bank interest 
paid to foreign addressees (at that time  still subject  to withholding 
tax) went to only three countries,  Switzerland,  the Netherlands,  arid the 
Netherlands  Antilles, nations that are notorious for their  use by those 
interested  in "treaty shopping."38 
24 V.  Potential Solutions 
Faced with the situation  just described, Latin  xnerican countries 
that are concerned  about the possibility  that generous tax treatment in 
the United States may induce  capital flight  have three  basic options. 
This section examines these  options.  It concludes that none of the 
three approaches is likely to be effective in eliminating  tax—induced 
incentives for capital flight 
First, they can attempt to adapt to the international  tax 
environment in order to minimize the damage to their  economies.  This 
would imply adoption of the worldwide principle and negotiation  of 
foreign tax treaties with the United States; presumably such treaties 
must contain exchange of information  agreements if they are to be 
effective.  This approach is unlikely to be effective. 
Second, they can attempt to change  the external environment  by 
persuading the United States and other developed countries to alter 
their tax treatment of income  earned by foreigners.  In essence this 
means convincing the U.S. and other developed countries to reverse their 
long—standing  preference for residence—based  taxation —  or at least 
actually to apply source—based  taxation to income originating  within 
their jurisdictions in order to avoid attracting  funds from Latin 
Mterica.  The outlook for this strategy is also not bright. 
A  third and far more extreme option  would be to adopt a 
fundamentally different system  of direct taxation that exempts capital 
income from domestic investment.  Such an approach would place 
domestic—source income from  business and capital on even terms  with 
income from foreign investment.  chile this approach  would produce a 
nre  nearly level playing field, it has certain obvious probleu. 
25 A.  Switch to Residence Principle 
At a superficial  level it might appear that the problem addressed 
in this paper could be eliminated if Latin  American countries now using 
the territorial  principle  would adopt  worldwide taxation of the income 
of residents.  In fact,  such an attempted solution  would probably be 
largely ineffectual, for reasons suggested  in section III.  By i,  elf, 
simply requiring  that residents  pay tax on worldwide income would have 
liotie effect, except  on those  who comply  with tax laws as a matter of 
moral principle.  It is true that failing to pay tax involves fraud and 
the psychological cost of fearing  the consequences of detection.  Even 
more rigorous  tax administration is unlikely to have a major effort in 
inducing compliance  with the tax law,  since the receipt of 
foreign—source  income is extremely  difficult to detect.  In the absence 
of exchange of information  agreements  between the United States and 
Latin  American countries, there  would be little possibility that tax 
could be collected on capital income  earned in the United States by 
residents of those countries. 
Even if exchange of information  agreements  would be completely 
effective,  but could be obtained only as part of a comprehensive tax 
treaty  with the United States,  it is not obvious that pursuing such 
agreements  would be in the interest  of most Latin American countries. 
It can be expected that the United  States would require  low withholding 
rates on  interest  and dividends as part of any such treaty.  The revenue 
loss that would result from accession to such  U.S. demands might be too 
great a price to pay.  This issue, while important,  cannot be pursued 
here. 
In fact,  exchange of information  agreements  would stop only the 
26 simplest forms of abuse, those in which the Latin American investor 
accurately reports  his or her name and address to the U.S. payor of 
interest,  dividends, etc.  A  relatively  simple way to circumvent the 
fiscal  authorities  would be to provide false information  to the payor. 
For example, a resident of Colombia  might give a Venezuelan address, if 
the U.S. had an exchange of information  agreement  with Colombia, but not 
with  Venezuela. 
To prevent this form of abuse it would be necessary for the United 
States arid the home country of the investor to detect the use of 
addresses of convenience in countries  imposing  no tax on such income. 
In order to understand the difficulty of relying on exchange of 
information  agreements to assist Latin  American countries in the 
implementation  of worldwide taxation  of the  income  of their residents, 
it is instructive  to contemplate the opportunities  for tax evasion on 
U.S.—source income that are open even to residents  of the United States 
created by the combination  of liberal U.S. treatment  of income 
ostensibly paid to foreigners  and lax administrative  procedures.39 
Even before passage of the 1984 legislation  that eliminated 
withholding  on portfolio interest paid to foreigners,  the following 
assessment  was made of the ease with which U.S. residents  could evade 
tax on interest received from domestic financial institutions: 
Evidence is mounting that some United  States residents  are 
posing  as foreign persons, establishing interest—bearing 
savings and checking accounts at United States  banks and 
savings and loam institutions,  directing that the interest 
income  be sent to them at an address f  convenience  in a 
foreign country, and omitting that interest  as income on 
27 their United States tax returns.  The failure of a United 
States resident to report this interest. .  . constitutes 
willful tax evasion.  (Karzon,  1983,  pp.  764—65) 
Nor is the cause of this growing source  of evasion difficult to ident— 
i.  Krzon  (1983) writes: 
The scheme  appears to succeed only because many barriers impede tax 
officials from detecting the transaction. At the United States  end 
of the transaction  the financial  institution  paying the bank 
interest is not required  to withhold tax or report the 
transaction...  [Al  survey  of the practices of representative 
ban  ing institutions  has indicated that many payors rely solely 
upon the foreign address submitted  by the depositor and have little 
or no internal safeguards  to verify a depositor's  true residency. 
(Karzon,  1983,  p. 765,766) 
one can only assume that similar abuses  will result  from the exemption 
of portfolio interest paid to foreigners,  despite the safeguards 
contained in the 1984 law.4° 
The implications for Latin  xnerican countries wishing to tax the 
worldwide income  of their residents  is obvious:  If the government  of 
the United States takes so little  pains to prevent this type of  evasion 
by its own residents,  there is little reason  to expect it to provide 
much U.S. assistance in helping Latin  american countries prevent evasion 
of worldwide taxes  on their residents.  It is unrealistic to expect the 
United States, through its fiscal  authorities, to do for other countries 
what it cannot —  or will not —  do  for itself. 
Aggravating the problem just described is the increased secrecy 
being provided by certain countries as part of an attempt to attract 
28 intermediation  of international  capital movements.41  Such secrecy laws 
"conceal the transaction  and the identity  of the taxpayer,  and block 
United States  authorities from gaining the information  necessary to 
trace and prove the fraud." (Karzon,  1983,  p. 779)42  Needless to say, 
problems of this type would be compounded  if Latin  American countries 
attempting to implement  worldwide taxation tried to penetrate the 
shield  of secrecy or asked the United States to assist them in doing 
43  so. 
Before the 1984 law exempting  portfolio interest  was passed, both 
Americans and foreigners  could resort to the use of nominee accounts in 
countries having favorable  tax treaties  with the United States to evade 
completely  or partially withholding  taxes on portfolio income,  including 
interest and dividends.  While this technique is no longer  necessary in 
the case of portfolio interest, its use remains a possibility (for  both 
Americans and those  from other countries)  in the case  of other forms of 
portfolio income.  Again,  it does not appear that cooperation between 
the United  States and a Latin  American country,  without the help of the 
U.S. treaty partner,  is likely to reduce this problem significantly. 
But  relying on U.S. treaty  partners is truly likely  to be an exercise  in 
futility.44  While the United States has an interest in persuading it 
treaty  partners not to allow  U.S. residents  to use this device to evade 
U.S. taxes, neither it nor the treaty  partners has much interest in 
preventing its use by residents of third countries.  It seems  quite 
unlikely that the United States  will expend  much more of its scarce 
political capital in convincing its treaty partners to cooperate  with 
Latin American countries to protect their fiscal  resources45 
There is also an interesting  question of whether a switch to 
29 residence—based  taxation  would constitute  sound public  policy.  To see 
this,  suppose that a Latin  american country were to attempt, even if 
unsuccessfully, to implement taxation on a worldwide  basis.  ny 
taxpayer repatriating funds  from abroad would  irrnuediately  face several 
questions:  whether  the repatriation  represented  a return flow of 
capital or taxable  income; whether tax had been paid on  income earned 
abroad in previous years; if such funds  were subsequently  invested 
abrrad. would they be presumed to earn  income  subject to tax?  All 
thirgs  considered,  a risk—averse  taxpayer  might be well—advised not to 
make the repatriation  or to hide it. 
B. Changing the International  Tax Environment 
As an alternative  to the futile  attempt to implement 
residence—based  taxation,  the countries  of Latin american might try 
again to convince the United States and other developed countries that 
they are wrong to favor residence—based  taxation and should increase 
their source—based  taxes.  At this  point it is appropriate  to quote at 
length from a recent  paper that blames allegiance  to the residence 
principle for the increase in tax evasion by U.S. citizens using the 
types of ruses described earlier in this paper: 
Responsibility for the burgeoning  tax evasion by United States 
residents  does not lie solely on  the doorsteps of the many nations 
accused of being tax or secrecy havens.  The  fault also lies in the 
historical United States insistence  on a treaty  policy which 
fosters international  tax evasion by favoring residency  basis 
taxation over source  basis taxation for portfolio income... .The 
tilt in treaty policy from source—based to residency—based  taxation 
30 of portfolio income  has widened the opening for tax evasion.  It is 
most difficult for a residence  country, such as the United States, 
to detect all portfolio income  earned abroad  by the United States 
residents  and all United States—sourced  portfolio income  and bank 
interest received  abroad by United States residents  masquerading as 
foreigners. with false foreign addresses....The  treaty  policy 
orientation  toward residency country taxation of portfolio income 
should  be reappraised,  and a return  to source country taxation 
should  be reconsidered.  . . .The  merit  of  source  country  taxation  lies 
in  its  simplicity  of  administration  and  certainty  of  tax 
collection.  .. . In view of the  sizeable  amount of United 
States—owned, foreicri—sourced  portfolio income,  this shift  might 
enhance rapport with developing countries,  long advocates of source 
taxation.  (Karzon,  1983,  pp.  827—31;  emphasis added) 
If the United States  would actually implement the source  principle 
that ostensibly  underlies its tax treatment  of income  earned in the 
United States  by foreigners,  the problems described in this paper  would 
be much less importanL  (They would not be eliminated  as long as other 
developed countries continued  generous treatment  of such income.  We 
return to this point below.)  It seems  unlikely, however, that there is 
much reason to expect that this approach  will  soon  be fruitful. 
As indicated in section IV,  current  U. S. practice in this area 
seems to reflect certain objectives.  Income from a U.S. trade or 
business  operated by a foreign person is taxed in full,  in order to 
avoid conferring a competitive  advantage on such persons, relative to 
americans.  Gains on the sale of real estate are now considered t  be 
31 derived from a trade or business, and thus subject to tax.  Again, there 
was a desire to equalize the tax treatment  of U.S. and foreign investors 
in real estate  and reduce  what were seen to be inappropriate incentives 
for foreign investment  in U.S. real  estate. 
y  comparison,  interest from bank accounts and interest  earned on 
portfolio investments  is exempt from  U.S. tax,  as long as it is not 
"effectively" connected  with a U.S. trade of business.  These 
execQtions—which  are totally inconsistent  with source—based taxation of 
income originating  in the United States—are  provided in part in order 
to attract foreign capital into the United States  and in part to avoid 
putting American financial institutions  and non—financial  borrowers at a 
competitive  disadvantage, relative to their counterparts in other 
developed countries.  Contrary to the situation  with income from a trade 
or business and capital gains on real estate,  there is no offsetting 
concern that foreigners  have an unfair competitive  advantage over 
Americans because of more favorable tax treatment.  Dividends (and other 
forms of 'fixed  or determinable or periodical"  income) continue to be 
subject to withholding, but this tax can be reduced by routing 
investment funds  through a treaty partner of the United States. 
Given the  recent  repeal  of 30 percent withholding on portfolio 
interest and the explicit expression of the sentiments  described 
previously as a reason for that legislation,  it seems highly  unlikely 
that the United States  will soon reverse this  policy.  Certainly it 
seems unlikely that the United States  will follow such a policy if other 
developed countries do not follow  suit.  American opponents of taxation 
of interest income  earned by foreigners  would point to the continued 
availability of debt instruments  in Europe on which there is no 
32 withholding as justification  for continuation  of the exemption. 
?'loreover,  as long as such instruments  continue to be available in other 
countries, taxation of interest  by the  United States would not be 
totally effective in solving  the problem of tax—induced capital flight 
from Latin  America, in any event,  Of course,  powerful political forces 
oppose changes  of this type in  Europe. 
The strongest impetus for a change  of this type in the United 
States is likely to be convincing  evidence that  Americans are evading 
substantial  amounts of U.S.  income  tax by such illegal  means as 
channelling  investments through foreign  nominee accounts and buying 
bonds of  F'merican  issuers that are targeted to foreign lenders.  While 
there is good reason  to believe both that abuses of this type existed 
before repeal  of 30 percent withholding  on portfolio interest and that 
they have beert aggravated  by repeal  of 30 percent withholding, there 
presently does  no seem to be uch sentiment in Congress to attempt to 
do anything about the problem.  Further  impetus  could  come  from the need 
for deficit reduction.  Additional federal revenues could be  raised by 
curtailing  the exemption of interest  going to foreign addresses. 
Even if the United States could  be convinced to tax interest income 
earned by foreigners  the problem examined in this paper probably would 
not be eliminated,  as long as reduced rates are applied to interest 
earned by residents of countries  with which the United States  has tax 
treaties.  As indicated earlier, funds  of Latin  American investors  could 
be channelled through selected tax haven" treaty countries in order  to 
benefit from such  reduced withholding rates.  This giimnick  would 
presumably  be available on both  interest and dividends  (and,  indeed,  on 
any  payment for which reduced  withholding  taxes are provided by -reaty). 
33 It seems  quite unlikely that the developed  countries of the world, 
traditionally advocates of residence—based  taxation, will reverse the 
historical trend of using treaties to reduce source—country  taxation of 
these income  flows, especially if the primary justification  is to assist 
the  developing countries in avoiding capital flight.  (Developed 
countries  might be somewhat  more sympathetic  to an appeal from LDCs 
based on the need for assistance in implementing  their income taxes.  Of 
course,  such  an  appeal  has little force as long as the developing 
countries continue to employ the territorial  principle.) 
A  less ambitious approach  would be for developing countries to 
appeal to the developed countries  for assistance in preventing their 
residents from using treaty shopping  to avoid payment of source—based 
taxes in other developed countries.  In this effort they might have as 
allies those developed nations who believe their own residents are 
engaging in similar abuses.  Of course,  this approach will have no 
effect, except for income  subject to withholding.  As long as interest 
remains largely untaxed when  paid to foreigners, it is the use of such 
devices as false addresses of  convenience  and nominee accounts by 
residents  of countries  employing the residence  principle that poses the 
problem.  Again, there  does not seem to be much reason to believe this 
approach  will be fruitful. 
C. A  More Radical Ppproach 
The discussion to this point  has been conducted in the context of a 
traditional  income tax in which interest  is a deductible expense and in 
which interest income is subject to tax,  unless explicitly exempted, as 
in the case of foreign—source interest  income earned  by residents of a 
34 country  with a territorial  system.  As indicated  above, there seems to 
be little  reason to expect that the tax—induced  incentives  for capital 
flight  from Latin Anerica will be reduced  in such an income—based  tax 
system.  It is possible, however, that a more extreme reform  offers 
somewhat more hope.  The remainder  of this section examines this 
possibility. 
An alternative to the traditional  income  tax that has gained favor 
among some academic observers provides tax treatment  for interest and 
dividends that is very different from that under the income tax laws of 
most countries.46  In particular,  no deduction is allowed for interest 
expense, and interest income is not subject to tax.  In addition, 
dividends are not taxable in the hands  of the recipient,  and as under 
the income  taxes of most countries,  they are not a deductible  expense. 
Thus interest  and dividends are placed on equal footing from a tax point 
of view, thereby eliminating the bias against equity finance found in 
the tax systems of most countries.47  Irmnediate deduction is allowed for 
all business purchases, including those  of capital goods; thus there is 
no need for either depreciation allowances  or special accounting  for 
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inventories.  The base of sucn a tax can be shown to be consumption, 
rather  than income.9 
The extreme simplification  of tax law that this alternative  would 
make possible has led some observerss  to suggest that it should  be given 
serious consideration by developing countries  for that reason  alone.50 
But for the present discussion  another aspect of this tax is more 
relevant.  This approach essentially  combats the problem of capital 
flight from LDC5 created by the tax exemption of certain income in its 
country of source by also exempting  much domestic—source income fm 
35 business and capital.51 
1. LDC Policy 
Predicting  the full implications  of adoption of a system  such as 
this for the problem of tax—induced  capital flight is quite difficult. 
If only a single  developing country  were to adopt the system, interest 
and dividends earned on domestic investment  would be exempt arid business 
income would be subject to a zero  marginal effective tax rate;  of 
course under most  income  tax systems  that are administered reasonably 
well  (and have adequate provisions  for withholding on interest) this 
benefit is now generally available only for  income on  capital invested 
abroad  (under  either  the territorial  system  or an ineffectively 
administered worldwide system).  This change  would appear to reduce  the 
tax incentives for capital  flight.  But interest  paid by domestic 
businesses would no longer  be a deductible  expense.  Depending on the 
relation between the marginal tax rates  currently applied to interest 
income and to the net income  of business, the net effect of such a 
change  might be either to increase  or reduce  the total taxation applied 
to domestic interest flows.  Given cortnnonly  observed patterns of asset 
ownership,  marginal tax rates,  and evasion of tax on interest income, a 
small net increase in the taxation  of interest paid by business might be 
expected.  By comparison,  there  would be no offset to the exemption of 
interest on  public debt.  Total taxation of domestic—source dividends 
would clearly drop, except in cases  where substantial relief  from double 
taxation of dividends already  exists. 
But this is only part of the story.  The immediate expensing  of all 
business purchases, including  capital goods and items added to 
36 inventory,  would further reduce  the taxation  of business income from 
equity investment in most countries.  This would be true especially 
where neither rapid  depreciation (or other generous investment 
allowances)  nor inflation  adjustment of depreciable  basis is allowed. 
The net effect of these changes would be too country—specific  to allow 
easy generalization.  For example, some countries  might allow such rapid 
depreciation that expensing  would provide little  additional  benefit. 
Similarly,  in a country that adjusts interest  expense for inflation the 
total  disallowance of deductions for  interest  expense and the exclusion 
of interest income from the tax base may be relatively  unimportant.  But 
movement from full deduction of nominal interest to no deduction would 
be dramatic.  Though capital flight  might be either  worsened or reduced 
as the net effect of a change  such as this,  a reduction  seems most 
likely fcr most countries that do not allow either inflation adjustment 
of depreciable  basis or generous capithi consumption  allowances. 
Of course,  this is still only part of the story.  The taxation of 
income from foreign capital invested in the country  would also be 
affected by a change as far—reaching  as this.  As for domestic firms, 
interest expense would no longer  be deducrlble,  but immediate expensing 
would be allowed,  Net effects would again be very country specific (or 
even industry of firm specific),  but it appears that taxation  would 
conaonly be reduced.  Revenues from foreign  investors might, however, be 
recouped through increased remittance  taxes on interest and dividends. 
Further complicating matters  is uncartainty  about how capital 
exporting countries that provide foreign  tax credits for source-'untry 
taxes on net moons would treat such a  tax and an  increased rerttanc 
taxes that might eccompany it.  Since  no  deduction is allowed 
37 interest expense, there is some risk that such a tax would not be 
allowed as a credit  against home—country taxes.52  Of  course,  to the 
extent that the tax—saving  benefits of expensing outweigh the 
tax—increasing  costs of the loss of the interest  deduction, tax 
liabilities  would fall and there  would be less of a problem than loss of 
the foreign tax credit  under an income  tax.  But the problem would 
resurface if higher remittance  taxes  were used to prevent a drop in 
rewtue from income  on investments  from foreigners. 
It is difficult to know  how capital—exporting  countries  would treat 
this tax.53  The United States  has traditionally  been zealous in its 
denial of foreign tax credits for any taxes other than those  on net 
income, in order to prevent the credit  being taken for gross receipts 
taxes, severance taxes,  disguised state royalties,  etc.,  especially 
those paid on the exploitation  of natural resources.  This focus on net 
income is evidenced by the insistence  that deductions  be allowed for all 
expenses of earning income. 
Of course,  the disallowance of interest deductions  under the tax 
being considered  here is quite different from the failure to allow 
deductions for expenses  under a gross receipts tax.  The interest 
disallowance is an integral part of a direct tax system  based on 
consummtion, rather  than income.  Noreover, it may typically  be offset 
—  or more than offset —  by the allowance of expensing  of all 
purchases.'4  This is potentially quite important under U.S.  law, which 
provides  that a tax can be creditable  even if it does not allow 
deductions for all expenses,  provided a compensatory  benefit of at least 
equal value is allowed.  On balance, it appears that there is at least 
some chance that the tax in question  would be creditable,  at least in 
38 the United States.  If it is (is not) creditable,  then the withholding 
tax on foreign remittances  would almost  certainly (not)  be creditable, 
since its creditability  would probably  depend on the creditability  of 
the underlying consumption—based  tax. 
A  final  word on  creditability  is appropriate  before leaving that 
issue.  The U.S. foreign tax credit  is,  in rough terms,  limited to the 
average U.S. tax rate  on foreign—source  income.  !'loreover,  this limit is 
calculated  on an "overall" (worldwide)  basis, rather  than on a 
country—by—country  basis.  Any foreign taxes in excess of the average 
U.S. rate result in "excess  foreign tax credits."  Recent changes in 
U.S. law, including rules for the determination of the source  of income, 
as well as rate reduction,  make it more likely than before that  American 
firms will be in an excess foreign tax credit  position.  To the extent 
this is true it may make relatively  little practical  difference  whether 
the tax under consideration  in this section is credited.  As long a the 
firm is in an excess credit position in the aggregate,  additional taxes 
on foreign income cannot  be credited,  even if,  in principle, they are 
creditable, 
2. Advanced Country Policy 
Widespread adoption of this approach by the developed countries 
could do much to elitainate the present tax advantages for foreigners  to 
invest in such countrios,  Under curLert law interest  paid to these 
investors benefits from the combination  of the interest deduction and 
the exclusion of interest income from  withholding tax;  in effect the 
combined (payor  cum payee) marginal tax rate applied to such inccne in 
the country of source is negative, the n:  tx  benefit  being  eqval in 
magnitude to the product of the interest  flow and the tax rate applied 
39 to business income.  (For  present purposes we can assume that such 
income is not effectively  taxed by the country of residence.)  Under the 
simplified  alternative  being examined here,  the combined marginal tax 
rate on such income  would rise to zero,  since the deduction for interest 
expense would be eliminated.  This would essentially  eliminate the tax 
advantages of capital flight  examined in this paper, even if LDCS did 
nothing, at least for debt capital. 
Perhaps as important, the possibility  of abusing this system 
through the use of foreign nominee accounts,  addresses of convenience, 
and treaty  shopping  would be eliminated.  Tax would, in effect, be 
collected through the disallowance of interest  deductions, rather  than 
withholding, and withholding  taxes could  be eliminated.55 
A  switch to a system of this type clearly does not offer a "quick 
fix.'  Its adoption  would run counter to decades of develonent  of the 
tax on net income.  There are also important concerns about equity and 
transition that  must be addressed satisfactorily. Moreover, under this 
approach taxation of capital income  is,  in effect, placed on a source 
basis, rather than a residence basis.  Thus the entire system of 
international conventions  dealing with flows of income  between nations 
would need to be rethought.56 
In particular, the developed countries  that have fought so 
diligently for residence—based  taxation  would need to reverse that 
stance.  Given the worldwide proclivity  to adopt "beggar — thy neighbor" 
policies —  even  by developed countries  in their dealings with LDCs, 
quick action of this type seem unlikely.  It is likely to come about 
only if LDC5 bind together in insisting  that present international tax 
conventions  do not function satisfactorily  and push for reconsideration 
40 of existing conventiorls.07  Though the road to a new international 
fiscal  order may be  a  long one, some  observers believe it worthwhile  to 
begin the  journey.58 
41 